One of the literature accounting and financial management, corporate governance, because it is believed that the mechanism of corporate governance receiver capabilities are used That have a direct impact on the ability of investors to force management to efficient use of existing resources in organizations are. The main role of financial reporting, effective in delivering information to people outside the organization credible and timely manner. Managers can use their knowledge about the company's business activities to improve the effectiveness of financial faces, as a means of conveying information to investors and potential creditors, use one of the modes of transmission of information, disclosure of which would be financed through faces. In this study, the relationship between ownership concentration and the percentage of institutional ownership has been dealt with voluntary disclosure data on the five-year period between the years 1389-1393 the firms listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange has been extracted. In order to analyze and test data, statistical software was used Excel and Eviews. The results of tests indicate that the concentration of ownership and the percentage of institutional ownership have a significant relationship with the voluntary disclosure.

Objective: Efficient investment in human resources and the factors affecting it are among the topics receiving less attention in the academic literature. This study seeks to investigate the impact of institutional investors and ownership concentration; as the two regulatory elements of corporate governance, on labor investment efficiency. Methods: To test the research hypotheses, a panel data model was used, and to measure the labor investment inefficiency, Jung Lee and Weber (2014) model was applied. The research sample, after imposing the intended restrictions, included 179 companies enlisted on the Tehran Stock Exchange, in the period from 2010 to 2019. Results: The results indicated that institutional ownership has no impact on the labor investment efficiency, while ownership concentration reduces it. This effect existed in the case of overinvestment but it was not observed in the case of underinvestment. Conclusion: Conflict of interest and information asymmetry between managers and owners increase the risk of inefficient decisions, especially in the context of investing in human resources and the risk is likely to be reduced by strengthening regulatory mechanisms. Corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership concentration, lead to more careful observation on management and reduce inefficiency in the made decisions.

In recent years, attention to the importance of optimal energy consumption has significantly increased. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector is one of the most energy consuming sectors and its energy intensity index has always been high. In this study, we use a seemingly unrelated regression estimator to estimate factors that affect energy intensity in manufacturing industries with ten or more employees in Iran. We compare energy-based industries and non-energy-based industries. The results of this study show that while energy prices are inversely related to energy intensity in both groups of industries, the effect of rising energy prices on reducing energy intensity in energy-intensive industries is much greater. The ownership structure and industrial concentration are also inversely related to the energy intensity of industry. More privatization and increased industrial concentration will reduce energy intensity, especially in the energy-based industries. The effect of research and development costs on energy intensity was either not significant or, contrary to expectations, was directly related to energy intensity.

The main objective of this study is to investigate relationship between ownership concentration and tax aggressiveness for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2002 to 2011. The research question is whether the type of largest shareholder ownership (public or private), affects tax aggressiveness or not. In this study largest shareholder ownership is used as concentration ownership measurement and effective tax rate as tax aggressiveness measurement. Lower the effective tax rate it means that firm is tax aggressive. Results of study indicate that when ownership concentration is higher, the firm is less tax aggressive. Probably this is due to the high concentration of state ownership. Social and political theory is confirmed.

This research attempts to investigate the relationship of investment opportunities and earnings management with respect to ownership concentration. Earnings management is measured by using absolute abnormal accruals proxy through Ball and Shivakumar model (2006-2008). Investment opportunities calculated as an independent variable through geometric growth, market-to-book asset ratio and factor analysis of these two indicators. Control rights and deviation between cash flow rights and control rights was considered as a measure for ownership concentration. Results indicate there is not any significant relationship exists between assets geometric growth and earnings management. Although, there is a significant relationship exists between high market-to-book ratio and factor analysis of these two indicators and earnings management. Furthermore, ownership concentration has not a significant effect on earnings management and investment opportunities and controlling shareholders do not use their monitoring role and their power to protect shareholders.

In this study we review the  relationship between ownership concentration (OC) and earnings quality (EQ) by testing the data collected from 148 listed companies in the Tehran’s Stocks Exchange during a 5 year period from 1381-85. Researchers have found mixed results about the relationship between these two subject matters. We argue that one of the main reasons of such countervailing evidences is that those authors have used inappropriate OC measures disregarding the mutual relationships among blockholders. In order to avoid the possibility of such happening, using an innovative measure of OC, we are convinced that the usage of group measures of OC is justifiable with respect to the review of outside blockholders’ impact on EQ in Tehran’s Stock Exchange. Considering the multidimensionality nature of EQ concept, we have applied in our models, a measure of EQ using the qualitative characteristics of financial information of the conceptual framework of Iran’s Accepted Accounting Standards (Relevancy & Reliability). The results indicate that outside blockholders significantly improve EQ, while we found no evidence of such impact by Insiders.